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ABSTRACT Organizations execute daily activities to meet their objectives. The performance of these
activities can be fundamental for achieving a business objective, but they also imply the assumption of certain
security risks that might go against a company’s security policies. A risk may be defined as the effects of
uncertainty on the achievement of the goals of a company, some of which can be associated with security
aspects (e.g., data corruption or data leakage). The execution of the activities can be choreographed using
business processes models, in which the risk of the entire business process model derives from a combination
of the single activity risks (executed in an isolated manner). In this paper, a risk assessment method is
proposed to enable the analysis and evaluation of a set of activities combined in a business process model
to ascertain whether the model conforms to the security-risk objectives. To achieve this objective, we use a
business process extension with security-risk information to: 1) define an algorithm to verify the level of risk
of process models; 2) design an algorithm to diagnose the risk of the activities that fail to conform to the level
of risk established in security-risk objectives; and 3) the implementation of a tool that supports the described
proposal. In addition, a real case study is presented, and a set of scalability benchmarks of performance
analysis is carried out in order to check the usefulness and suitability of automation of the algorithms.
INDEX TERMS Business process management business process model security-risk assessment
model-based diagnosis constraint programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Organizations carry out several activities to meet their objec-
tives. The execution of each of these activities can imply 
tackling certain security risks. For example, when a web ser-
vice is published to provide the products of an organization, 
data leakage or loss of confidentiality can occur, although 
these updates are essential for the modernization of the orga-
nization. Moreover, the activities are not executed solely in 
an isolated manner; they can be choreographed by using 
business processes models formed of a set of activities [1] 
whose execution can imply tackling more complex security 
risks. Therefore, the analysis of the business processes [2] 
is crucial to understanding the impact of the possible risks. 
In this work, risks refer to IT security risks. A risk is defined 
as the effects of uncertainty on the achievement of the goals
(e.g.; data corruption or unauthorized access). The decision to
execute a business process in a company to achieve its objec-
tive [3] implies the acceptance of the derived risk (or even
operational risks [4]). This derived risk is a combination of
single risks associated with the activities that conform to
the process. The risk assessment of business process models
is crucial to detecting potential security risks. For instance,
business process compromise attacks [5] are used in an
attempt to understand a business process behavior with the
aim of manipulating it and generating specific profits for
attackers. After understanding a process behavior, an attacker
might deploy malware within certain tasks that are executed
unintentionally by an employee. This malware can allow
the attacker the unauthorized access to the systems, such as
access to confidential information. Therefore, the organiza-
tion must measure and assess the isolated risks and combined
activity risks that can cause this type of threat in their business
process models (e.g.; data leakage caused by staff). The main
implemented tools are explained. Section VIII describes the
application of the tools to the motivating case study and
Section IX discusses the results pertaining to the scalabil-
ity and the performance of our tool. Section X provides
an overview and comparison of related work found in the
literature. Finally, conclusions are drawn and future work is
proposed in Section XI.
II. MOTIVATING CASE STUDY OF RISK ASSESSMENT
To illustrate the scope of the proposal, the case study depicted
in Figure 1 is used. The example shows a business process
model that describes the hiring process steps in an organiza-
tion. This process is an adaptation of a real business process
from the Bonita Open Solution suite of examples [14] and
is very similar to the processes that might be audited in an
ISO/IEC 27001:2018 certification. The process tends to be
automated for the organization because different departments
are involved and various tasks can programmed. Figure 1
describes three business processes, divided into different
pools that represent the three departments of the organiza-
tion, human resources, hiring nanager and IT. In this paper,
we use BPMN2.0 [15] as the business process standardwhich
permits us to describe the relational order between the activ-
ities in an imperative manner. Following BPMN 2.0, every
business process starts with a start event and ends with an
end event (both represented by a circle). The execution order
of the activities (rounded rectangles) is determined by the
control flow (arrows) and gateways (+ or ×) for parallel and
exclusive execution of their branches. The human resource
process includes activities related to managing the register
with the social security administration and payroll of employ-
ees. The hiring manager organizes the place to work and
the accreditation to company access. The IT business process
configures the software profile and hardware requirements.
The business process models must be assessed. To this end,
as shown in Table 1, security experts have identified a set of
threats that could affect those processes.
III. FOUNDATIONS: RISK-AWARE BUSINESS PROCESS
MODELS, VERIFICATION AND DIAGNOSIS
Risk is defined by ISO/IEC 27005:2018 [12] as the estimation
of the degree of the value of exposure to a threat that mate-
rializes over a number of assets causing damage or loss to
the organization. It is particularly important to analyze when
organizations use business process and software solutions
as a service (BPaaS or SaaS). In these cases, security risk
analysis is essential due to the outsourced services. The risk
estimation is based on a risk formula that involves certain
metrics, which refers to business process model elements and
threats. Formally, the estimation of risk can be defined as
follows:
Definition 1: A risk, Ri, is defined by a formula, fRi , used
to estimate the value of risk with regard to the combination
of a set of metrics (m1 ×m2 ×m3 · · · ×mp) related to assets
and threats.
fRi : m1 × m2 × m3 · · · × mp→ Ri (1)
objective should be determine which tasks might potentially 
be affected by these threats.
Organizations are becoming increasingly complex but 
security-aware, because their services tend to be automated 
and published on software platforms. However, only a few 
organizations assess their security risks [6]. A vast number 
of risk methodologies are available, such as MAGERIT 
 [7], 
CRAMM
 [8], COSO [9], CORAS [10], and the use of 
standards such as ISO/IEC 27000 series, NIST SP 800-30, 
AS/NZS 4360:2004, and BS 7799-3:2006. The main objec-
tives of these methodologies include the identification of risks 
that could compromise the normal work of the organization, 
the identification of the assets that could be affected, and the 
remedial action(s) that must be adopted. Each method and 
standard provides its own metrics and catalogs to carry out 
risk management. Although these methods address risks from 
a general point of view, open problems persist. In this paper, 
we focus on how the partial risk of the activities combined in 
the business processes of the companies can affect the global 
risk of the organization. Another important point to analyze 
is the automation of this risk analysis for combined activities 
because the implementation of the majority of these meth-
ods [11] implies a manual, informal, textual, detailed and 
complex process. This process requires a large investment in 
resources by the organization [11].
The standards ISO/IEC 27005:20018 [12] and UNE 
71504:2008 [13] identify business processes and information 
as relevant assets to be measured in organizations. Unfor-
tunately, the proposals found in the literature are oriented 
towards the definition of risk for each single activity. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no solution that infers the 
security-risk level of the entire process and takes into account 
the work-flow that combines the tasks and the partial risk.
This paper focuses on combining together business pro-
cess management (BPM) and security-risk description. More 
concretely, determining how to obtain the level of risk for the 
entire process and how to identify the risk responsible for a 
nonconformity are paramount to this relationship. To achieve 
it, the proposals of the paper include (1) a framework for 
a risk-aware design and the development of business pro-
cess models; (2) a verification algorithm that checks whether 
every trace of the annotated process model satisfies the risk 
objectives determined by the organization; (3) an algorithm to 
diagnose the risk responsible in the case of a nonconformity; 
and (4) the integration of the previous proposals into an 
implemented tool that supports graphical design, verification 
and diagnosis.
This paper is structured as follows: Section II introduces 
a motivating case study. Afterwards, the set of elements 
involved in risk-aware business processes is formalized in 
Section III, and the extension of the business process models 
is detailed in Section IV. In Section V, the verification and 
diagnosis of a risk-aware business process model is formu-
lated. Section VI describes the associated models and algo-
rithms to verify and diagnose the problem in an automatic 
manner. In Section VII, our proposed framework and the
FIGURE 1. Business process model of the arrival of a new employee to an organization.
TABLE 1. Description of threats.
Frequently, a risk formula combines the value of an asset,
the frequency of appearance, and the consequence of the
execution of a certain threat. Therefore, a risk formula can
be represented by the following formula:
Risk = value ∗ consequence ∗ frequency (2)
As previously mentioned, ISO/IEC 27005:2011 [12] and
UNE 71504:2008 [13] establish processes as relevant assets
to be considered in risk assessment. In our approach,
we assume as assets both a business process model and an
activity within it. Therefore, a risk can be associated with an
execution of the entire business process and the combination
of the execution of its activities. In any case, the definition of
the business process model is essential to identify the possible
risks. The example introduced in Figure 1, BPMN 2.0 is used
to describe the business processes.
Definition 2: A business process model, BPk , is com-
posed of a set of m activities {A1,A2, · · · ,Am} and events
(i.e., start, intermediate and end) that are performed in coordi-
natedmanner using a set of control-flow gateways (i.e., AND,
OR, XOR) that describe the relationship between them.
Despite the existence of a wide range of business process
modeling languages such as BPMN 2.0, Petri Nets [16],
Event-driven Process Chain (EPC) [17], and UML Activity
Diagram [18], none define specific issues concerning risk
management.
A risk must be estimated by combining of the risk obtained
for each individual activity and regarding the control-flow
perspective of the business process model.
Definition 3: The risk of a BPk is a combination of the risk
of each activity {RA1 ,RA2 , · · · ,RAm} of the model, according
to the order relation between the activities defined by the
control-flow.
RBPk = fControlFlow(RA1 ,RA2 , · · · ,RAm ) (3)
The estimation of these risk values is part of the risk assess-
ment procedure. Thus, the estimation of a risk only produces
a value that must be compared with the acceptable level of
risk included in the company goals. This acceptable level of
risk can be used as a risk threshold to verify whether a specific
value associated with a risk is acceptable. Organizations must
establish a set of business goals related to the appraised value,
e.g., a risk of a business process BPi is acceptable if RBPi ≤ n,
where n may be the acceptable risk threshold.
Definition 4: A risk-aware business process model
(RBP) is described by the tuple 〈RBPk , BPk , BGj〉, where
RBPk represents the risk related to the business process model
BPk , and BGj represents a business goal which establishes,
for instance, a threshold of acceptable risk for a RBPk :
RBP ≡ 〈RBPk ,BPk ,BGj〉 (4)
In general, this risk threshold is fixed globally for the
risk assessment. This threshold allows for the comparison
of the acceptable level of risk with the risk of business
processes.
Definition 5: Verification of RBP conformance (VRC)
is defined of the tuple 〈RBP, conpi〉, where conpi is a set
of elements {p1, p2, p3, · · · , pn}, where each pi is a tuple
〈RiskAk , boolk 〉, where boolk is a Boolean value that repre-
sents whether the RiskAk , which belongs to a process, BPk
in RBP, satisfies the risk criterion according to the business
goals, BGj in RBP.
n⋃
i=1
pi ∪ BGj 0 > (5)
be achieved by fault diagnosis theory. The fault diagnosis of
a VRC identifies the set of activities of the business process
model BPi in RBP that are responsible for the inconsistency.
The diagnosis therefore strives to determine why a risk-aware
business processmodel is unexpectedly nonconforming to the
acceptable risk level.
Definition 7: The fault diagnosis of aVRC is theminimal
subset of activities, 4, that belong to the PEFs, such that
4 contains at least one activity for each PEFk where the
boolk element of pi is false (cf. Def. 5). The subset 4 of
PEFk is minimal iff no proper subset of 4 is a fault diag-









IV. RISK EXTENSION FOR BUSINESS PROCESS
MODELS IN A NUTSHELL
In previous works, we defined a lightweight extension of
the BPMN 2.0 meta-model [22], [23]. This extension derives
from two main models UML Profile for Modeling Quality
of Service and Fault Tolerance (hereinafter QFTP) [24] and
Business Motivation Model (BMM ) [25]. QFTP provides a
set of generic concepts to develop risk assessment capabilities
within IT systems. In contrast, BMM provides a model for
defining and developing business plans. Business plans are
carried out in a final stage by business processes [3]. Thus,
BMM enables both the identification of factors and relations
to define business plans and determine how to achieve and
assess these plans.
As an example of the extension the IT process from the
proposed case study is illustrated in Figure 2. The pools are
extended with information related to the objectives and threat
scenarios. These threat scenarios enable the definition of the
threats and countermeasures to be considered for the risk
assessment. Each activity is enriched the corresponding met-
rics along three security dimensions and linked to the threats
from the scenario. More information about the elements of
the extension is provided in [22] and [23].
V. RISK ASSESSMENT OF BUSINESS PROCESS MODELS
The risk assessment of the business processes of an organi-
zation is crucial to detecting and avoiding undesirable situ-
ations. The extension of the BPMN metamodel described in
the previous section to a business process management sys-
tem provides amechanism for automating the risk assessment
and the detection of nonconformance elements, minimiz-
ing human intervention. To this end, this section introduces
how the partial risk of the activities can be combined in a
formulation to carry out the estimation of risk of an entire
business process model. This formulation is based on a set
of patterns according to the control-flows included in the
process, which are used afterwards to verify the conformance
of the process. In our approach, independence on the activities
risk is assumed.
The system conpi is unsatisfiable with regard to the BGj 
constraints established, i.e. if any boolk is false. Therefore, 
the risk of each activity has a truth value that describes the 
conformance to the goals.
The execution flow of activities in a business process 
model is specified by arrows (i.e., sequence flows in BPMN) 
and control flow elements (i.e., gateways in BPMN) between 
the activities. A business process model is composed of 
various potential sequences of execution flows, which are 
possible paths of executions.
Definition 6: A potential execution flow (PEF), PEFi 
consists of a possible sequence of activities {A1, A2, · · · , Am} 
that can be executed according to the work-flow [19]. PEFi, 
is a set of activities that corresponds to a possible instance in 
a business process model from a start event to an end event 
of a BPk .
To determine what happens when the risks exceed the 
expected goals, the identification of which element produces 
the fault responsible for the nonconformity is necessary. 
However, it is also important to note the problems to define a 
treatment plan and thereby diagnose which is the risk respon-
sible. We propose the use of a model-based diagnosis [20] 
to detect the parts of a system that fail in accordance with 
the expected model [20], [21]. This model-based diagno-
sis must be adapted to risk-aware business process models, 
which implies the analysis of the conformance of the business 
process model and each PEF.
The diagnosis aims to identify the activities whose associ-
ated risk produces an inconsistency. This identification might
FIGURE 2. Example of business process model extended for risk assessment.
A. CONTROL-FLOW PATTERN-BASED RISK ESTIMATION
Following Def. 1, the risk of an asset must calculated by
means of a formula. This formula is defined based on metrics
related to the activities and the threats. Numerous risk assess-
ment methods are widely used in the estimation of risks,
such as FMEA [26] and MAGERIT [7]. In our approach,
the following risk formula is adopted. Nevertheless, we must









In this formula, D refers to security dimensions
(e.g., Integrity, Confidentiality and Availability of the asset,
and Consequence and Frequency refer to properties of a
particular threat.
The risk formula could consider countermeasures. This
consideration requires to adjusting the risk formula by sub-
tracting the risk reduction (RR) of consequence and/or
frequency of threats. Therefore, the consequence and the
frequency can be reformulated as follows:























In our approach, risks and threats are associated with
activities. Therefore, the main problem is determining how
to address the risk of the entire business process model. Our
approach considers that the risk of a business process model
should be estimated through the combination of the risks
of each individual activity regarding the control-flow of the
business process model.
The standard ISO/IEC 27005:2011 [12] in its Appendix E
applies an average to determine the global risk for a set of
assets. Subsequently, this standard suggests the suitability of
this average for the risk determination of business processes.
As proposed in the mentioned standard, a set of patterns for
risk estimation as the average of the activities of a business
process model is provided in [23].
A generic formulation based on those patterns and the
average is proposed and specified in the Formula column of
Table 2. These risk formulas take into account the structure of
the business process and the average as a similar adaptation to
the estimation of the time-efficiency proposed in [27] and the
estimation of security proposed in [28]. The defined formulas
are examples that illustrate each pattern because they can
be customized. Business processes with a complex structure
can be calculated using a combination of these patterns. This
combination results in an approach for determining the aver-
age of the risk of the activities for an entire business process.
As an illustration, a small example of one risk estimation of
the business process BP1 is established in Figure 3. The risks
of the activities of BP1 are assumed as already calculated
for the dimension of integrity: Risk IA1 , Risk
I
A2




Risk IA5 , Risk
I
A6
, Risk IA7 , Risk
I
A8




risk can be calculated for the remaining security dimensions.
Risk IBP1 is dynamically built in accordance with the
control-flow and the patterns defined in Table 2. First,
the business process begins with a start event S1, which
is followed by a sequence of activities that starts with A1.
The sequential pattern introduced therefore indicates that
the risk is the sum of the activities that compose this
sequence, divided by the total number of activities. In this
case, the sequence is composed of A1,A2, a Parallel pattern
(hereinafter P1), A5, A6, an Exclusive pattern (hereafter E1),
FIGURE 3. Example of a business process model to be assessed.
TABLE 2. Basic patterns for risk determination in business process models.
and finally A10. Hence, Risk IBP1 is given as follows:























+Risk IE1 + Risk
I
A10 )/7 (11)
As previously mentioned, the standard ISO/IEC
27005:2018 [12] in Appendix E applies an average to deter-
mine the global risk. Therefore, the inclusion of the average
bymeans of the total risk of activities gives rise to an approach
of risk as 1 ≤ Risk IBP1 ≤ 100.




It has been assumed that the business process is well-designed
Risk IBP1 =























without structural faults, and gateways are presumed to be
opened and closed correctly. Based on the concept of an
average, the risk of a Parallel pattern is estimated as the sum
of the risk activities of which each branch of the pattern is
composed, divided by the total of activities of the parallel pat-
tern. In the example there are two branches: the first branch
composed of activity A3, and the second activity composed of
activity A4. Therefore, Risk IP1 is estimated by the following
formula:












In contrast, the risk of an exclusive pattern is estimated
by the maximum risk between the involved branches. The
exclusive pattern is based on the idea that only one path is
executed. Although all the paths must be considered, we only
select the one with the maximum risk value.
In this case, there are two branches: the first composed
of activities A7 and A8, and the second branch composed of
activity A9. Therefore, Risk IE1 is determined as follows:
















Finally, by combining the three formulas previously
described, fseq, fpar , and fexcl , the risk Risk IBP1 becomes as
indicated in the listing (14), as shown at the top of this page.
These formulas are described to provide a way of estimating
the risk of business process models.
B. PEF-BASED RISK ESTIMATION
The estimation of risk of the business process model
described in the previous section is necessary for the veri-
fication of conformance with regard to the acceptable risk.
Nevertheless, PEFs are necessary for the diagnosis of which
activities are responsible for the nonconformance (if any).
A business process model is composed of a set of PEFs
(cf. Def. 6), where these PEFs define different sequences of
execution. Therefore, the risk of each PEF is determined by
the risk of the activities that compose it.
We propose to use the addition of the activities risk of each





This risk estimation could be adjusted depending on the
necessity of the organization because another approach might
be required, such as, the average of risks instead of the aver-
age. In our approach, these adjustments can be established at
the beginning and before the risk assessment is carried out.
This separation between PEFs is suitable for the diagnosis.
In general, the diagnosis enables the identification of the parts
that fail, and determines why a correctly designed system fails
to work as expected. Adapted to our problem, the diagnosis
is utilized to identify which elements in the model are in
nonconformance with respect to the acceptable risk level.
One of the most important advantages of the proposal is
the use of these elements to diagnose the fault responsible
for the nonconformity. To automate both the verification of
conformance and the diagnosis, constraint programming (CP)
technique is proposed. CP is an artificial intelligence tech-
nique widely used to solve diagnosis problems in various
fields [29]–[31]. In the following section, the verification and
diagnosis using CP are described in detail.
VI. AUTOMATIC VERIFICATION OF CONFORMANCE AND
DIAGNOSIS BY USING CONSTRAINT PROGRAMMING
To automate both the verification of conformance and the
diagnosis, we propose a two-step subprocess called Automate
Security Risk Assessment (see Figure 4). More details about
the entire process are provided in Section VII, where the tool
is described.
First, the Verify Conformance activity runs the risk esti-
mation of the business process model and verifies its confor-
mance with regard to the acceptable risks that are included
as a part of the CSP. This verification task is responsible
for the calculation of the truth values of the verification
(cf. Def. 5). The truth values ofVRC are obtained bymeans of
a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) (cf.CSP in the figure)
created automatically by the transformation of the risk-aware
business process model into a CSP model. The resolution of
the CSP obtains those truth values. If any risk formula is
nonconforming, the fault diagnosis (cf. Def. 7) is executed
(cf. Diagnose in the figure) by creating and solving a Max-
CSP to identify the activities whose risks are directed toward
the VRC. Both CSP andMax-CSP are explained follows.
Constraint programming [32], [33] is based on the algo-
rithmic resolution of CSPs which are defined as follows.
Constraint Satisfaction Problem. A constraint satisfac-
tion problem (CSP) consists of the triple (V,D,C), where V is
a set of n variables {v1, v2, · · · , vn} whose values are taken
from finite, discrete domainsDv1 ,Dv2 , · · · ,Dvn respectively,
and C is a set of constraints on their values. The constraint
ck (xk1 , · · · , xkn ) is a predicate that is defined on the Cartesian
product Dk1 × · · · × Dkn . This predicate is true iff the value
assignment of these variables satisfies the constraint ck .
Constraint solvers strives to propagate a value for each
variable to satisfy the constraints within CSP, where each
constraint is defined over some subset of the original set
of variables and limits the combinations of values that the
FIGURE 4. Description of the process for verification nonconformance and diagnosis of security-risks.
FIGURE 5. Code of the CSP for the verification of conformance.
to the objectives of the organization. An example of a CSP
is given in Figure 5. This code might represent a piece of
the CSP generated for a business process model similar to
that shown in Figure 2, where two activities, A1 and A2, are
in an exclusive pattern. We can assume, for example, that
activity A1 is defined only for the integrity dimension and
is affected by threats TH1 and TH2 and that activity A2 is
defined for integrity, confidentiality, and availability dimen-
sions and is affected by the same threat as A1. The acceptable
risk level (cf. AcceptableriskBPi ) is limited to one hundred
twenty.
The variables in the example are defined with an open
domain, because, prior to solving the CSP, it is impossible to
determine their specific values until an attempt is made to sat-
isfy the constraints. Thus, there are three types of constraints:
variables in this subset can take. The goal is to find one 
assignment to the variables such that the assignment satisfies 
all the constraints. In certain types of problems, the goal is to 
find all such assignments [34].
In our approach, a CSP is created combining the for-
mula obtained from the control-flow analysis and the risks 
deemed acceptable by the company. The parts of the CSP 
are: (1) the variables and domains of the problem correspond-
ing to the metrics provided by the activities (e.g., integrity, 
confidentiality, and availability), threats (e.g., frequency and 
consequence), and countermeasures (e.g., risk reduction);
(2) the risk estimation of the activities represented using 
constraints; (3) constraints obtained from the control-flow 
pattern-based risk estimation, using the pattern formulas pro-
vided in Table 2; and (4) the acceptable risks corresponding
FIGURE 6. Code of the Max-CSP for the diagnosis.
1) Risk estimation of activities, which defines how the risk
determination is calculated based on the risk method
previously selected, such as the ones defined in (10).
2) Risk estimation based on the control-flow, which rep-
resents the combination of risks of activities following
the patterns defined in Table 2.
3) Conformance, which represents the achievement of the
acceptable risks. For example, the risk of the business
process for each dimension is less than the acceptable
risk level.
This CSP is solved to determine if there is a solution (i.e.,
conformance) or not (i.e. non-conformance). A case of non-
conformance, means that the model is not conformant to the
acceptable risk. To ascertain which activity is responsible of
the nonconformance, a new model is computed to determine
the diagnosis. This new model consists of the risk formulas
related to all the PEFs of the business processmodel as aMax-
CSP to discover theminimum explanation of themalfunction.
Max-CSP. The maximal constraint satisfaction problem
(Max-CSP) is an optimization problem over CSPs with a
function f to optimize (minimize or maximize). The goal is
to assign values to the variables to optimize the function.
Following the same example, the Max-CSP includes the
same structure as the previous CSP but includes the PEFs
instead of the control-flow pattern-based risk formula (PEF1
and PEF2 for the example), and assigns the possible respon-
sibility of the nonconformance to a Boolean variable (Reified
Constraints). The possible ranges of the metrics were defined
as a part of the variable domain in the previousCSP, however,
if a nonconformance is found these domains can fail. For
this reason, in the Max-CSP code in Figure 6, these domains
are associated with a Boolean value (reified constraints) that
allow these domains to be nonsatisfiable. Due to the exclusive
pattern, the business process is composed of two PEFs: (1)
PEF1, which is composed of activity A1; and (2) PEF2, which
is composed of activity A2. In any case, the objective function
is to maximize the satisfaction of every domain, the con-
straints RefA1 and RefA2 in this example. These variables
take a value of 1 (i.e., true) if the formula is satisfiable, and
0 (i.e., false) otherwise. These reified constraints indicate
whether the constraint can be satisfied. That is, RefA1 is
evaluated as true iff RiskPEF1integrity can achieve a value less
than AcceptableriskBPi ; otherwise, RefA1 is false (cf. Def.
5). When RefA1 cannot be satisfied, a nonconformance in
this PEF is indicated by the activity A1 in this dimension.
In this particular case, the diagnosis explains this problem as
the impossibility of satisfying the constraint associated with
an activity by attaining a set of assignments of values that
achieve less than the acceptable risk value. Constraints can
be defined similarly for other PEFs and dimensions.
When all PEFs are modeled in the same manner, the objec-
tive is to determine an assignment that enables the satisfaction
of the maximum number of constraints related to the all
activities that composing the PEFs of the model. As shown
in Figure 6, the function of Max-CSP indicates the necessity
to satisfy both RefA1 and RefA1 if possible.
In a manual process, all the activities involved in the PEFs
must be reviewed. Nevertheless, diagnosis provides the min-
imal number of activities (parsimony principle) that must be
treated to reduce the risks of the business process model.
This problem is too complex to solve manually; therefore,
we establish a mapping to an optimization problem by means
of constraints (cf.Max-CSP).
VII. TOOLING
Figure 4 describes our proposal to ensure a risk-aware busi-
ness process model development described by using a busi-
ness process model. To easily support the diagnosis using
FIGURE 7. OPBUS-Risk integrated development editor.
CSPs, we implement a tool following the steps described
using the business process model in Figure 4.
The implemented tool (called OPBUS-Risk) is an exten-
sion of OPBUS [35], an Eclipse plug-in based on model-
driven architecture technologies that integrates (1) a business
process modeler that supports the specification of the exten-
sion presented in Section IV; (2) a transformation engine
that enables business process models extended with risk
information to be translated into CSP and COP models;
(3) a mechanism to support various constraint solvers; and
(4) the automation of the verification and diagnosis processes
through a set of algorithms that create the CSPs andMax-CSP
and solve them.
a business process within objectives and the value of assets,
and can include threats to activities. The modeler is provided
with a set of validation scripts that enables the detection of
possible structural faults (e.g., live-locks, starvations) and
verification of the correctness of time events, conditions,
etc. Moreover, the OPBUS-Risk environment is equipped
with specific features to obtain a direct transformation of
business process models into COMET
 models, as shown in
the contextual menu of Figure 7. The transformation can be
configured through property windows of the tool.
Furthermore, the OPBUS-Risk plug-in is equipped with a
validation option, as indicated in the Edit menu in Figure 7.
In this case, the validation option performs the following steps
in an automatically: (1) business processmodels in the current
workspace are transformed into CSP and Max-CSP models;
(2)CSP andMax-CSPmodels are solved by a specific solver;
and (3) results are returned to the graphical model.
In validation, risk estimation is carried out and noncon-
formance of risks is identified. The results are retrieved over
the graphical elements of the business process, whereby those
elements that are in nonconformance are highlighted in red.
The identification of these elements in the model constitutes
the completion of the diagnosis. A video of the key features
of the OPBUS-Risk plug-in, including the complete set of
resources (plug-in, models, CSPs, etc.) used for this paper can
be consulted at http://www.idea.us.es/portfolio-item/opbus-
tool/.
In the following section, a case study is presented as an
illustrative example. This example describes the complete
process of applying our framework to develop a risk-aware
To render our proposal flexible, agile, and general, 
we define a solver-independent approach through transfor-
mations. A model-driven approach is based on a set of 
transformations (model-to-model) that enables the automatic 
translation of business process models, extended with a risk 
model, into platform-specific Max-CSP programs for IBM 
CPLEX [36], ChocoSolver [37], and COMET 
 Solver [38]. 
This transformation uses a set of auxiliary functions to deter-
mine PEFs, reified constraints, risk expressions, and other 
structures that compose the CSP and Max-CSP scripts. When-
ever any other platforms require support, we must only to 
provide a transformation to those platforms.
Figure 7 shows the OPBUS-Risk tool workspace. The 
modeler enables the users to define a business process model 
and set up the risk information by means of the Properties tab 
(cf. Figure 7). The Properties tab is where the users can edit 
properties of the model, such as the acceptable risk value for
FIGURE 8. Business process model of the example with PEFs.
business process model and our tool for the automatic risk
assessment.
VIII. APPLYING TO THE MOTIVATING CASE STUDY
The case study described Section II was developed using the
OPBUS-Risk modeler as shown in Figure 8. In the figure,
the activity labels are abbreviations of the real name of activ-
ities whose names are listed in Table 3.
The threats presented in Table 4 must be assessed. To this
end, security experts attach threat scenarios to the model,
as shown in Figure 8. Human resources and hiring man-
ager departments have an associated threat scenario (Threat
Scenario 1) composed of three threats and two countermea-
sures. IT, however, has an associated threat scenario (Threat
Scenario 2) composed of a single threat, as shown in Figure 2.
To simplify the example, the labels of threats and countermea-
sures are only identifiers. Tables 4 and 3 provide descriptions
of countermeasures and threats respectively.
Security analysts include these features to carry out auto-
matic risk assessment and identify of any nonconformance.
Because the problem is focused on the diagnosis of the non-
conformance to an acceptable risk level of a business process,
the acceptable level of risk for each business process must be
defined first.
One of the main challenges associated with security is its
measurement [39]. Most risk management proposals provide
their own metrics. These metrics are defined by qualita-
tive and quantitative approaches. Nevertheless, stakeholders
are held responsible for the choice of either the acceptable
range of values (in the case of a qualitative approach) or the
TABLE 3. Activity abbreviations for the example.
TABLE 4. Description of countermeasures.
acceptable qualitative value (with regard to the global qual-
itative scale). A good practice using a quantitative approach
is to define a mapping of the range of values to a qualitative
scale, as given in [40]. This mapping provides an overview of
values that may be considered of low, medium or high risk.
TABLE 5. Risk criteria for business processes.
Subsequently, business and security stakeholders must agree
on the acceptable risk level and introduce it into the busi-
ness process. One of the main advantages of our proposal
is that stakeholders must adjust the acceptable risk values in
the business processes, and then our tool can automatically
diagnose whether business processes can achieve or exceed
this level.
The main objective is the identification of any non-
conformance. Therefore, security experts should indicate
these objectives for each business process separately,
as shown in Table 5. In the same table, business objectives
establish what states of the business process risk cannot
exceed the risk criterion.
TABLE 6. List of threats and values associated with the activities of the
business process.
TABLE 7. Frequencies and consequences related to threats.
TABLE 8. Risk reduction values related to countermeasures.
which potential execution flows in the business process are in
nonconformance to the objectives. In Figure 8, the PEFs for
the example are highlighted, but these PEFs are only taken
into consideration in the definition of the CSP model.
Because, the OPBUS-Risk tool supports the transforma-
tion into COMET
 CSP models, a CSP model is generated
for each business process. As explained in the previous sec-
tions, a Max-CSP model is also generated for each business
process.
TABLE 9. Nonconformance by activity.
Table 9 presents the risk value obtained in the solution of
CSPs for all the activities belonging to certain PEFs previ-
ously identified. Similarly, nonconformance of these activ-
ities is indicated with regard to the acceptable risk of the
business process.
These results are obtained automatically in background
mode. The nonconformances are reflected in the graphical
model, as shown in Figure 9. Activities highlighted in red are
nonconform.
In a second step, business and security experts have to 
collaborate to evaluate business process activities. The busi-
ness process activities are configured by linking threats and 
evaluation to each activity. The relationships between threats 
and value are presented in Table 6. The activity values 
are specified by intervals of values that indicate the mini-
mum and maximum allowed values. Similarly, properties for 
threats and countermeasures are described in Tables 7 and 8, 
respectively.
At this point, the security analyst is ready to apply the 
automatic diagnosis. To this end, the security analyst has to 
utilize the ‘‘Validate’’ options provided by the OPBUS-Risk 
tool. This option automatically transforms the business pro-
cess models into CSP models, and a constraint solver obtains 
the solutions for these constraint models. As explained in the 
previous section, the diagnosis addresses the identification of
FIGURE 9. Results of the diagnosis of nonconformance in the business process model.
IX. IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE AND
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The benchmarks consist in performing the verification of
nonconformance and diagnosis using three different con-
straint programming engines: IBM CPLEX, COMET
, and
ChocoSolver 2.0 for various examples of business processes.
The examples have been categorized with regard to the size,
understanding size as the addition of activities, threats, and
treatments within the business process model: (1) tiny busi-
ness processes with no more than 10 elements; (2) medium-
large business processes with more than 10 and fewer than
20 elements; and (3) large business processes with more
than 20 elements. We have used the examples in Table 2
(sequential, parallel, exclusive, and loop) for the first cate-
gory. Business processes of the case study (human resource,
hiring manager, and IT) have been used for the second cate-
gory. Regarding the third category, two synthetic examples
have been employed. The first synthetic example (Sy1) is
composed of 18 activities, 10 gateways, 3 threats, and 2 treat-
ments. The second synthetic example (Sy2) is composed
of 18 activities, 10 gateways, 10 threats, and 5 treatments.
Three features have been measured to analyze the scalabil-
ity and performance: (1) number of variables and constraints
required to create the CSP models; (2) memory consumption
required by the engine to find a solution; and (3) time in
milliseconds required by the engine to find a solution. The
hardware used in the execution of the benchmarks is an Intel
Core i7 2675-Q 2.20 GHz, with 8GB RAM (DDR3) and a
Windows (64-bits) operating system.
Regarding variables and constraints, it is important to note
that each constraint programming engine has a particular
syntax and semantics with which to define constraint satis-
faction programs. The number of variables and constraints
varies depending on the problem, because, for each activity,
threat, and treatment, at least one variable in the CPS must
be created. The results are similar among the three constraint
programming engines. Nevertheless, specific variables need
to be computed with regard to various other variables and
certain engines; for example, ChocoSolver and IBM CPLEX
use expressions to represent this type of variable. That is,
the terms are considered variables by the CSP. This is the
reason why ChocoSolver and IBM CPLEX show the same
trend in all examples. Nevertheless, COMET
 uses con-
straints to represent this type of variable. Hence, COMET

shows a peak in the majority of examples, such as shown
in Figure 10a.
Figure 10b shows the results obtained with regard to mem-
ory consumption. The results illustrate how the memory
consumption levels off and remains unchanged in terms of
the size of the problem for every constraint engine. Native
implementation of the engine has been used. Nevertheless,
we must note that memory consumption is a particular
feature of each constraint programming engine. COMET

uses an engine implemented in C++ although it provides
libraries for using the engine in JAVA. In contrast, Choco-
Solver and IBMCPLEX use an engine implemented in JAVA,
although it provides connectors to be used in C, C++, JAVA,
FORTRAN, and others languages.
Regarding the performance, it should be noted that a loga-
rithmic scale has been used to represent the results for a better
comparison as shown in Figure 10c. In general, the perfor-
mance results are feasible for the automation of our proposal
with regard to all engines less than one second in the worst
cases. The results fluctuate depending on the problem and the
execution engine as shown in Figure 10c. IBM Cplex levels
off in all cases although the size of the problem is increased
as shown for Sy1 and Sy2. Nevertheless, IBM Cplex yields
better results than Choco and COMET do in the worst cases.
ChocoSolver and COMET
 yield similar results in the small
and large cases, although in the medium cases, COMET
 is
FIGURE 10. Results of the benchmarks. (a) Number of variables and constraints. (b) Memory consumption. (c) Performance.
better than ChocoSolver. ChocoSolver show improvements in
the medium cases; however, Choco’s results level off as the
proble size increases.
X. RELATED WORK
a business process model, but the authors lack mechanisms
for measuring risks and diagnosing the risk responsible for
a nonconformity. Their proposition can be considered a set
of controls to treat possible security risks from a catalog of
possibilities.
There exists a set of proposals focused on providing
enhancements in business process languages through new
domain specific languages (DSLs) for the incorporation of
assets, requirements, goals, and threats into business process
models. Certain relevant studies provide approaches for the
integration of risks into the business process. Cope et al. [43]
propose new notation for business process modeling notation
(BPMN) to aid documentation in the risk assessment of busi-
ness processes. The two major limitations of this approach
are as follows: (1) the proposal extension is very complex
because it presents three separate models related to the same
problem; and (2) the extension is only valid for BPMN mod-
els. zur Muehlen and Ho [44] propose taxonomy to enable
the integration of risk into business processes focusing on
EPC-based process models. The taxonomy is applied with
the aim of enabling the analysis and documentation of busi-
ness processes. Lambert et al. [45] propose an extension of
the integrated definition for function (IDEF) modeling that
Business process management (BPM) and risk description 
are typically considered disjoint concerns as stated in [41]. 
This study is one of the few approaches in academia that 
provides risk-aware business process management. Neverthe-
less, Suriadi et al. [41] indicate the following as the main 
gaps to address BPM and risk management (1) the degree 
of formalization of various manifestations of risk within a 
process model is minimal because most approaches formal-
ize their risk-related constructs only at the syntactic level 
(without execution semantics), thus limiting an automation;
(2) there is a lack of research to support risk-aware business 
process design; and (3) the adoption of existing risk manage-
ment techniques and standards into BPM systems should be 
strengthened.
Another initiative in the context of BPM that bridges the 
gap between security and business domains is [42]. Ahmed 
and Matulevičius [42] propose a set of security patterns 
based on BPMN to ensure a secure-aware development of
supports the description of sources of programmatic risk in
business processes. Churilov et al. [46] present a frame-
work for the evaluation of risks in business process
management based on value-focused process engineering.
Rodríguez et al. [47] propose an extension to UML 2.0 activ-
ity diagrams such that graphical annotations can be pro-
vided for the specification of security requirements in the
diagrams. This extension is defined by means of a UML
profile called BPSec. Their approach is very similar to that
presented in [48], althoughWolter et al. provide a set of secu-
rity annotations to specify requirements in BPMN models.
Xue et al. [49] propose an extension of BPMN models with
risk management properties. These authors use the control
flow of business processes to determine the risk in terms of
economic consequences of a data error. Fenz et al. [50] define
an approach for the automatic determination of the impor-
tance of resources that takes into consideration the control
flow of business processes. The authors use a transformation
of BPMN models to Petri nets and define a formalization to
determine the importance of resources used in business pro-
cesses. Our approach considers a set of patterns influenced by
ISO standards that enable the determination of the risk based
on the control-flow perspective. However, our approach is
more adaptable and flexible because no risk formula for
activities is fixed in the formulation. Any other risk formula
can be configured as explain in the tool section. However,
the adjustment of the patterns to another formulation involve
a minimal effort because the use of a model-to-model trans-
formations requires only a change in the transformation.
Many more general approaches exist. Governance, risk
management, and compliance (hereinafter GRC) [51] has
emerged in the organization arena as a frame of reference
for integrating these three areas. GRC aims to align and
integrate governance, enterprise risk management and com-
pliance concerns to avoid and overlap gaps between them.
Racz et al. [52] present a survey that shows the lack, in the
literature, of approaches pertaining to integrated GRC. The
authors highlight a lack of consensus regarding the concept
of GRC, and underline a fuzzy separation between GRC and
enterprise risk management (ERM) in the organizations. The
authors propose a frame of reference for integrated GRC.
There exists a need for integrated GRC with business process
and management, as stated in [53], in which a survey of state-
of-the-art GRC software is provided. Jürjens [54] presents
a UML extension called UMLsec. This extension provides
certain UML profiles to aid the security-aware development
of systems based on UML. Nevertheless, UMLsec is only
defined for UML-based developments because it is not a
business-oriented approach. Jakoubi and Tjoa [55] propose a
notation-independent model as a reference model. Likewise,
Sackman [56] extends current risk management methods by
bridging the gap between the business process view and the
more technical view of IT risks. These approaches propose
theoretical reference models to fill the void between business
and risk domains. In other respects, Neubauer et al. [57]
propose a framework for the analysis of the security of
business processes from the point of view of cost-benefit.
Their framework proposal is defined for integration into
any business process management approach. Neubauer and
Heurix [58] and Neubauer et al. [59] provide other contri-
butions focused on the determination of security controls.
Neubauer and Heurix [58] propose an approach for the
risk analysis and the selection of adequate security controls
for business processes. However, only an overview of the
approach is provided because no details on how to calcu-
late business process risk or on the selection of security
controls are given. Neubauer et al. [59] focus on the selec-
tion of ISO/IEC 27001 controls countermeasures based on
multiple objectives (such as cost and benefit). The CORAS
method [10] conducts context-independent security risk anal-
ysis, which is abbreviated to ‘‘security analysis’’, and pro-
vides a domain-specific language inspired by UML for threat
and risk modeling. The CORAS language includes various
types of diagrams using varied notation, thereby providing
a computerized tool designed to support the documentation,
maintenance and reporting of analysis results through risk
modeling. Sienou et al. [60] focus on presenting a framework
that unifies risk management and business process manage-
ment. Their approach is limited to the presentation of various
stages of the framework and how it operates from a theoretical
point of view. Other approaches that consider processes but
also data perspectives are presented in [61]. The authors
provide a DSL that extends data flow diagrams (DFD) with
risk descriptions to easily assess the risks of the data from a
personal data protection point of view.
The main drawback in all these studies lies in the manual
nature of their approaches. These approaches are focused on
extending models to enrich their expressibility such that the
documentation of risk assessment in business processes can
be supported and improved. However, there is a serious lack
of tools and mechanisms for the automation of the process
of risk assessment in business processes. Other approaches
strive towards the automation of the generation of security
countermeasures and/or controls in business process models.
Menzel et al. [62] propose an approach to automate the gener-
ation of security controls for business processes in accordance
with specific risk thresholds. The authors provide a risk scale
aligned to a set of security controls that can be applied in dif-
ferent parts of the model. Nevertheless, the authors make no
previous assessment of the model and hence fail to properly
identify which risks exist in the model. Related to this work,
Wolter et al. [48] provide security annotations for graphi-
cal business processes that enable security configurations to
be directly set up in the business process model. However,
the approach pays no attention to risk or to the previous risk
assessment of the model because these authors focus only on
presenting the mechanisms to set up and generate specific
security configurations in the model. Other approaches, such
as that described [63], try to determine the level of risk based
on a business process state. Feng et al. [63] apply fuzzy
mechanisms to study the level of risk of a business process
state.
TABLE 10. Comparison of approaches.
nonconformance is also carried out. To this end, the proposal
applies mechanisms based on the model-based diagnosis
in which activities are in nonconformance with regard to
the acceptable level of risk. The automation of diagnosis is
carried out using artificial intelligence techniques based on
constraint programming. The proposal is supported by the
implementation of a plug-in that enables the graphical spec-
ification of the extension and the automation of the verifi-
cation and diagnosis process. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first published work that addresses the risk-aware
design of business processes with automatic techniques.
Our approach has been used to support the ISO/IEC
27001 certification process of the security in the business pro-
cesses of R+D projects developed by a foundation [65]. The
OPBUS-Risk tool has played a crucial role in the risk assess-
ment of potential security-risk nonconformance in business
processes, and the foundation has been successfully certified
for more than three years in ISO/IEC 27001.
The present work can be extended in several ways. We pro-
pose to study the inclusion of new metrics to provide wider
assessments with regard to other objectives (e.g., data qual-
ity). Moreover, a risk treatment stage can be included in cases
in which security controls are selected to act against non-
conformances diagnosed in risk assessment. The framework
could be extended with specific algorithms to automatically
select the best countermeasures to act against specific threats.
These countermeasures should be transformed into specific
real configurations. Likewise, M2T transformation can be
equipped to generate tailored code, configurations and/or
procedures for a specific platform where business processes
can be performed, such as in transformations to a specific
BPM engine.
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To provide a clear picture of all aforementioned research, 
a comparative study of the most relevant approaches related 
to the topic of this paper is given. The comparative study 
follows the survey presented in [22], as shown in Table 10.
The symbol Xis used to indicate that the approach supports 
this category, the symbol ∼ is used to indicate that the 
approach partially supports this category, and the symbol * 
is used as a wildcard to indicate that the approach supports 
all possible values in this category. This comparison is car-
ried out according to the following categories. (1) Modeling: 
indicates which modeling languages are supported. (2) Secu-
rity dimensions: indicates whether the evaluation of assets 
is carried out with regard to different security dimensions.
(3) Objectives: indicates whether the approach supports the 
specification of requirements. (4) Threats and vulnerabilities: 
indicates whether the approach supports the specification of 
threats and vulnerabilities. (5) Countermeasures: indicates 
whether the approach supports the specification of Coun-
termeasures. (6) Automatic analysis: indicates whether the 
approach supports the automatic assessment of models to 
detect nonconformances. It should be noted that the majority 
of approaches support several characteristics. Furthermore, 
no approach supports or fosters a process for the analy-
sis of the conformance of the requirements specified with 
regard to risk or security issues as identified in the proposed 
model. (7) Risk estimation: indicates whether the approach 
supports the determination of the risk value of business pro-
cesses or specific elements within the model. (8) Control 
flow: indicates whether the approach takes into consideration 
the control flow for the risk estimation.
XI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH WORK
In this paper, the problem of automatic security risk man-
agement in the current BPMS is addresses. First, a formal-
ization of the risk elements according to process models is 
included. These elements are supported as a BPMN 2.0 exten-
sion of risk information that is analyzed to determine non-
conformance regarding risk goals. In addition, a diagnosis 
of the risk associated with the activity responsible for the
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